Hastings International and Comparative Law Review
Volume 43
Number 2 Summer 2020

Article 8

Summer 2020

Systems of Preferential Tax Treatment in the EU: A Case Study of
Apple, Inc.
Constanza Ortiz

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_international_comparative_law_review
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the International Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Constanza Ortiz, Systems of Preferential Tax Treatment in the EU: A Case Study of Apple, Inc., 43
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. Rev. 365 (2020).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_international_comparative_law_review/vol43/
iss2/8

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Hastings International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized editor of
UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.

7 - Ortiz_HICLR_V43-2 (Do Not Delette)

5/7/2020 3:10 PM

Systems of Preferential Tax Treatment in the EU:
A Case Study of Apple, Inc.
CONSTANZA ORTIZ
Transfer pricing allows corporations to shift profits from high-tax
jurisdictions to low-tax jurisdictions. When employed by multinational
corporations, which produce up to 70% of the world’s trade, many can
shelter billions of dollars in tax havens. This paper explores how this is
possible by analyzing the use of Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Tools in
Ireland.
I.

Setting the Scene1

On May 21, 2013, the CEO of Apple, Inc. (“Apple”), Tim Cook, found
himself testifying before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations for
the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the
United States Senate.2 This subcommittee has the authority to investigate
investment fraud schemes, commodity and security fraud, computer fraud,
and the use of offshore banking, etc.3 Cook was summoned to speak about
the tax strategies used by Apple after members of Congress began to examine
how “multinational corporations use[d] loopholes in the Tax Code to move

* Juris Doctor Candidate Class of 2020 graduating from the University of California
Hastings College of the Law. Special thanks to HICLR, especially, Articles Editor
Christopher Vitt for being so generous with his time and for editing my paper with so much
care—you are truly appreciated. Thanks also to my colleagues and friends from the World
Bank Group and Georgetown Tax Law Practicum for their comments, suggestions, and
insights.
1. Please take note that the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act has promulgated new rules to combat
some of the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting mechanisms mentioned in this paper. This does
not affect the analysis of the paper because the paper focuses on the EU Commission’s ruling.
For example, the U.S. Corporate Tax Rate has been decreased from 35% to 21%. See Tax
Cuts and Jobs, §13001 26 U.S.C 11 (2017).
2. Offshore Profit Shifting and the U.S. Tax Code—Part 2 (Apple Inc.): Hearing Before
the Subcomm. of Investigations of the Comm. On Homeland Sec. and Gov’t Affairs, 113th
Cong. (2013) (statement of Timothy Cook, CEO of Apple Inc.) [hereinafter Statement of
Timothy Cook].
3. ABOUT THE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS, https://www.hsgac.
senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/about (last visited Dec. 14, 2019).
365

7 - Ortiz_HICLR_V43-2 (Do Not Delete)

366

Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.

5/7/2020 3:10 PM

[Vol. 43:2

profits to offshore tax havens to avoid paying U.S. taxes.”4 Concluding the
subcommittee’s investigation, legislators addressed some of the concerns
cited in its report.5
Ireland was the primary offshore tax jurisdiction highlighted in Cook’s
testimony to Senate; although Ireland is the primary focus here, note there
were many other jurisdictions across the European Union (“EU”) which
offered and continue to offer comparable treatment to U.S. based technology
companies.6 When this investigation began the European Commission—the
executive branch of the EU—decided to intervene to determine how these
allegations, if confirmed, affected competition rules in the EU. Following a
two-year investigation, on August 29, 2016, Margrethe Vestager, the
European Commissioner for Competition concluded:
“Member States cannot give tax benefits to selected companies—this is
illegal under EU state aid rules … Ireland granted illegal tax benefits to
Apple, which enabled it to pay substantially less tax than other businesses
over many years … this selective treatment allowed Apple to pay an effective
corporate tax rate of 1% on its European profits in 2003 down to 0.005% in
2014.”7
In the Commission’s ruling, Apple was ordered to pay Ireland a total of
13 billion euros to make up for years of unlawful Irish subsidies.8 Unlike the
EU Commission, the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) in the U.S. did not
find Apple’s tax avoidance scheme to be illegal.9 A tax loophole called
4. The Senate Subcommittee memorandum examined the relationship between Irish tax
law on residency and loopholes in the U.S. tax code (subpart F), specifically the ‘check-thebox’ and ‘look-though’ rules. Offshore Profit Shifting and the U.S. Tax Code—Part 2 (Apple
Inc.): Hearing Before the Subcomm. of Investigations of the Comm. On Homeland Sec. and
Gov’t Affairs, 113th Cong. (2013) (statement of Sen. Carl Levin, D. Rep. Michigan)
[hereinafter Statement of Carl Levin].
5. Supra note 1.
6. “Seven EU countries (Belgium, Cyprus, Hungary, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta and
The Netherlands) display traits of a tax haven and facilitate aggressive tax planning.” See
European Parliament Press Release; Tax crimes: special committee calls for a European
financial police force (February 27, 2019).
7. European Commission Press Release IP/16/2923, State Aid: Ireland Gave Illegal Tax
Benefits to Apple Worth Up to €13 billion (August 29, 2016) [hereinafter Commission Press
Release].
8. Sean Farrell and Henry McDonald, Apple Ordered to Pay €13bn After EU Rules
Ireland Broke State Aid Laws, GUARDIAN (Dec. 14, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/
business/2016/aug/30/apple-pay-back-taxes-eu-ruling-ireland-state-aid.
9. “The check-the-box loophole allowed U.S. companies to strip profits from operations
in high-tax countries simply by marking an IRS form that transforms subsidiaries into what
the agency calls a ‘disregarded entity.’” Shane Ferro, A Popular Irish Corporate Tax
Loophole Is Now Dead — Here Are Three Other Loopholes, BUSINESS INSIDER (Oct. 14,
2014), https://www.businessinsider.com/double-irish-other-corporate-tax-loopholes-2014-10.
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“check-the-box” rule allowed Apple’s actions to be in compliance with tax
filing requirements at the time. Despite careful investigation, Apple has only
been subject to the legal reprimands of the EU Commission.10
The purpose of this paper is to explore and examine the legal and
corporate tax reasons why, and how, Ireland has employed state aid to
provide preferential tax treatment to companies like Apple. Although, the
main events analyzed in this case study occurred between 2014-2016, the
underlying issues are still ongoing and represent major points of contention
for the EU and the Trump administration.11 Following reactionary tax
reforms by U.S. and EU legislators, it is unclear whether effective action has
been taken by both hegemons to close loopholes long abused by savvy tax
planners. By understanding the elements addressed in the Commission’s
decision regarding Apple’s activity in Ireland, the reader will be better
positioned to determine whether new measures of enforcement are equipped
to limit the unparalleled ability of creative tax planning professionals behind
systems of preferential tax treatment in the EU.
II. Transfer Pricing
Part of the reason why Apple has billions of dollars abroad is due to a
concept called transfer pricing.12 Fundamentally, a transfer price is the price
one unit of a business charges another unit—of the same business—for a
good or service (also, the “widget” or “widgets).13 Normally the price of that
widget should remain relative to its fair market value. Where a transfer price
differs from the fair market value of the widget, the result is that one business
unit will enjoy a capital advantage while the other business unit is
disadvantaged and records a loss in profit from the sale.14 Sometimes,
transfer prices can be disproportionate because of factors such as exchange

10. United States Tax Court, Docket Inquiry, https://www.ustaxcourt.gov/USTCDock
Inq/Default.aspx?CorporateName (last visited Mar. 31, 2020).
11. David Floyd, Explaining the Trump Tax Reform Plan, INVESTOPEDIA (Jan. 20, 2020),
https://www.investopedia.com/taxes/trumps-tax-reform-plan-explained. See also Tax Cuts
and Jobs, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 13001(c), 131 Stat. 2098 (2017) (codified at 26 U.S.C. 11
(2017)).
12. “Ireland made a special deal with Apple—a transfer pricing ruling called an advance
pricing agreement—under which Apple’s Irish affiliates paid far less than the 12.5% rack
rate.” See Lee Sheppard, The EU Case Against Apple’s Irish Tax Deal, FORBES, (Sept. 5,
2016) https://www.forbes.com/sites/leesheppard/2016/09/05/the-eu-case-against-apples-iris
h-tax-deal/#15a991194768.
13. Transfer Price, OECD GLOSSARY OF STATISTICAL TERMS (2008).
14. E. Buono, International - Transfer Pricing Aspects of Intra-Group Services: What
Are the Open Issues and What Can Be Improved?, 27 INT’L TRANSFER PRICING J. 1 (2019).
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rates or customs tax, however, absent these challenges, a transfer price can
also be subject to manipulation so that the majority of a company’s profit is
moved somewhere else—preferably to a place with a lower tax rate.15
Multinational Enterprises (“MNE” or “MNEs”), especially those who
manufacture tangible products, regularly employ intra-firm trading. Intrafirm trading occurs when the parent company trades with its domestic and
foreign controlled subsidiaries, or vis-a-versa.16 According to the OECD, in
2014 MNE’s made up half of the world’s exports.17 That same year, United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (“UNCTAD”) estimated
that MNE’s would dominate 80% of world trade by 2018.18 An MNE with a
global supply chain as big as Apple’s could benefit from employing artificial
transfer pricing. Consider the example below. Refer to FIGURE 1 for a visual
illustration. Note the values have been exaggerated to show the illegal use of
transfer pricing.
Imagine MNE X produces cars and is incorporated in the Unites States.
It plans to sell its cars in all continental Europe. MNE X has two subsidiaries
abroad. Sub1 builds the engines and Sub2 builds the frames and assembles
the car to its final stage. Disregarding other transaction costs, imagine Sub1
sells its engines to Sub2 for half the price. Naturally, Sub1 loses money
because it is selling its product at half the fair market value. As a result, Sub2
can now sell the finished product at a discounted price because its overall
cost of goods sold (“COGS”) is much lower than anticipated. Sub2 will be
able to sell more cars at a lower price mark and gain a larger profit. Sub2’s
overall profit will make up for any lost profit by Sub1, and because they are

15. Alicia Tuovila, Transfer Price, INVESTOPEDIA (Oct. 24, 2019), https://www.investo
pedia.com/terms/t/transferprice.asp.
16. Intra-firm trade, OECD Glossary of Statistical Terms, OECD PUBLISHING, (2008)
https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264055087-en.
17. Koen Debacker and Sebastien Miroudot, International Trade and Investment Two
Sides of the Same Coin?, POLICY NOTES OF THE ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION
AND DEVELOPMENT [OECD] (May 2018), http://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/international-tradeinvestment-policy-note.pdf.
18. Id.
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Figure 1
Constanza Ortiz, Systems of Preferential Tax Treatments in the EU, (2019).

both affiliates to MNE X, there has only been an artificial shift of profit from
Sub1 to Sub2.
Like individuals, companies must pay tax on their income ; this is
known as the Corporate Tax.19 MNE X will have to pay taxes in the U.S. and
everywhere else it has an affiliate. Now imagine Sub1 resides in Brazil where
the corporate tax rate is 34% and imagine Sub2 resides in Ireland where the
corporate tax rate is 12.5%.20 Say the overall sale of the cars sold by Sub2
amounted to $2 million USD. Because the final sale of the cars occurred in
Sub2—the Irish subsidiary—the $2 million profit is income to Sub2,
19. Julia Kagan, Corporate Tax, INVESTOPEDIA (July 5, 2019), https://www.investo
pedia.com/terms/c/corporatetax.asp.
20. Info Sheet, Corporate Tax Rates 2019, DELOITTE, INT’L TAX (2019), https://www2.
deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Tax/dttl-tax-corporate-tax-rates.pdf.
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therefore it will be taxed at a corporate tax rate of 12.5%, which comes out
to a tax liability of $250,000.
Imagine if this transaction had happened the other way around. The $2
million profit would have been taxed at 34% in Brazil and would have
incurred a tax liability of $680,000; that is more than twice the amount in
Ireland. Additionally, recall that at the beginning of this exercise, Sub1 in
Brazil also recorded a
loss on their balance
sheet when it sold its
engines to Sub2 for
half the price. Not only
did the profits from the
car sales been recorded
in Ireland, but the
income that remained
in Brazil is much lower
than it should have
been; because, the
2
transfer pricing mirrors what would Figure
Constanza Ortiz, Systems of Preferential Tax Treatments in the EU, (2019).
have been the Brazilian subsidiary’s
profits as a decrease on the Irish subsidiary’s COGS. Refer to FIGURE 2 for
a visual illustration. This is a good outcome for Sub1, because it will have
less income taxed at the 34% Brazilian corporate tax rate. By manipulating
the transfer price at the onset, MNE X and its affiliates sheltered more than
$250,000 from being taxed which is now a net profit for the entire company.
This is how transfer pricing can be manipulated.
III. IRISH BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING (BEPS) TOOLS
Now imagine, instead of cars, MNE X sold an intangible product such
as an idea, or a math formula. Unlike a car with wheels and an engine, it is
more difficult to determine the value of an intangible asset. One way to
measure its value would be to determine the costs required to protect it, such
as a patent or trademark.21 However, what happens in the scenario where a
huge MNE is conducting intra-firm trading and needs to sell only a piece of
that idea to another unit; or, instead, imagine the object it wants to sell has
no way to be formally patented (i.e., skill and knowledge of the workforce,

21. Kelvin King, The Value of Intellectual Property, Intangible Assets and Goodwill,
WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION (hereinafter WIPO), (2019) https://www.
wipo.int/sme/en/documents/value_ip_intangible_assets_fulltext.html.
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training systems and methods, customer lists, distribution networks, etc.)?22
While this issue can be difficult to settle internally, it becomes an even
trickier dilemma when tax authorities are required to determine if a transfer
price has been made at “arm’s length” by one unit of the business to another.
The “arm’s-length principle” as applied in transfer pricing states the
amount charged by one related party to another for a given product must be
the same as if the parties were not related.23 An arm’s-length price for a
transaction is therefore what the price of that transaction would be on the
open market. For commodities, like a car or bananas, determining the arm’slength price can be as easy as referring to the price a non-related party
assigned to the same item elsewhere, but when dealing with intangibles, such
as intellectual property, arriving at an arm’s length price can be a more
complicated task.24 Consequently, since valuation for these products can be
difficult to determine, it is easy to both intentionally and unintentionally
participate in abusive transfer pricing behavior.25 Here lies the paramount
issue the EU Commission found during its two year investigation of Apple’s
transactions in Ireland.26
A. Research and Development
Apple used transfer pricing to reduce its overall profit in high tax
jurisdictions by giving the economic rights of its intellectual property to its
Irish subsidiary.27 In his article, Nobel laureate economist, Joseph Stiglitz,
brilliantly describes the issue:
“The real source of blame is the transfer pricing system—established
and maintained by the advanced countries. This system allows corporations
22. Id.
23. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], “The Arm’s
Length Principle” in OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and
Tax Administrations 2010, (2010), https://doi.org/10.1787/tpg-2010-4-en.
24. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], Model Tax
Convention on Income and on Capital: Condensed Version, (2017), https://www.oecdilibrary.org/taxation/model-tax-convention-on-income-and-on-capital-condensed-version-20
17_mtc_cond-2017-en.
25. See generally Detlev Vagts et al., TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS PROBLEMS, (5th ed.
2014).
26. “Following an in-depth state aid investigation launched in June 2014, the European
Commission has concluded that two tax rulings issued by Ireland to Apple have substantially
and artificially lowered the tax paid by Apple in Ireland since 1991.” European Commission
Press Release IP/16/2923, State Aid: Ireland Gave Illegal Tax Benefits to Apple Worth Up to
€13 Billion (Aug. 29, 2016), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_
16_2923.
27. Commission Decision 17/1283, SA.38373, 2017 O.J. (L. 187) 1, 5 (EU).
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to artificially segment their activities into infinite numbers of subsidiaries
which are taxed as separate businesses and gives corporations wide latitude
to move profits into low-tax jurisdictions like Ireland, using mythical
internal prices. In this case Ireland went one step further by allowing the
shifting of profits to subsidiaries that exist in cyberspace and have no
employees” (emphasis added).28
Here, the underlying economic issue is, Apple like most tech
manufacturers earns most of its profits by selling intellectual property not by
selling the physical hardware of a phone or an iPad.29 In the history of iPhone
production, the costs to produce the physical hardware has been as little as
$183 (Apple iPhone 5C), and as much as $490.50 (Apple iPhone 11 Pro
Max).30 Meanwhile these phones have had a retail price of $549 and $1,449,
respectively.31 That means Apple enjoyed profit margins well within 6070%. The difference between the production costs and retail value reflects
the profit earned on Apple’s intellectual property.32 Here, the intellectual
property being transferred is referred to as “research and development.”
Research and development (“R&D”) is the designation given to the activities
companies conduct to innovate and introduce new products and services—
for Apple, that could be software development, engineering, etc.33 The
economic purpose of R&D is to create new or improved technology that can
provide a competitive advantage for the business.34 R&D became the item
used to transfer large amounts of capital from high tax jurisdictions to lower
tax jurisdictions. This was especially true in 2004 when Ireland introduced
an R&D credit which allowed companies to reduce their overall taxable
corporate income.35 Over time, Ireland made various amendments to this tax

28. Joseph Stiglitz & Erika Siu, The Apple tax tussle shows the need for a new way of
taxing profits, Columbia University, Sept. 15, 2016 https://www8.gsb.columbia.edu/facu
lty/jstiglitz/sites/jstiglitz/files/Apple%20Tax%20Tussle_0.pdf.
29. Tuan Do, The Real Production Costs of Smartphones, TECHWALLS, (Nov. 24, 2019)
https://www.techwalls.com/production-costs-of-smartphones/.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Will Kenton, Research and Development (R&D), INVESTOPEDIA (June 25, 2019),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/randd.asp.
34. Anil Khurana, Strategies for Global R&D: A study of 31 companies reveals different
models and approaches to the conduct of low-cost R&D around the world, 49 RES.-TECH.
MGMT. (2006). See also Research and Development, INC., https://www.inc.com/encyclo
pedia/research-and-development.html.
35. Info Sheet, The research and development tax credit in detail, KPMG (Feb. 1, 2019),
https://assets.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/ie/pdf/2019/01/ie-the-research-and-development-taxcredit-in-detail.PDF.
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credit which now allows companies to take up to 25% of their R&D
expenditures for both revenue and capital in a tax credit.36 This credit still
remains as the tool used to directly offset a company’s overall corporate
income tax.37 Interestingly, this amendment was made in 2014, the same year
Apple restructured its Irish subsidiaries for the second time.38 When Apple
found a tax structure described as the “holy grail of tax avoidance,” Senate
investigators learned that billions of dollars were being transferred to
subsidiaries that on paper stated being in Ireland, but in reality had no
buildings, no employees and no physical location.39
B. “Ghost Companies”
Apple managed to find the “holy grail,” or rather a loophole in the tax
code by utilizing a very specific type of base erosion profit shifting tool
(“BEPS), called the “Double Irish” arrangement—later implemented as the
“single Irish.”40 BEPS are corporate tax planning strategies employed by
multinationals to purposefully shift profits from higher tax jurisdictions to
lower tax jurisdictions, thus “eroding” the “tax–base” or total taxable income
of the higher tax jurisdictions.41 Query what the difference is between
transfer pricing and BEPS. Recall transfer pricing is a normal sales
transaction that occurs between business entities which may or may not be
subject to abuse depending on whether products are priced to the fair market
value.42 Here, BEPS refers specifically, to all the creative ways a tax advisor
may structure a company’s tax plan to transfer as much money out of a high
tax jurisdiction to drastically reduce the corporation’s taxable income.43

36. Id. “revenue and capital” (emphasis added to highlight rents, royalties and other
general payments for the exchange for R&D, is sufficient to comply with the standards of the
tax credit).
37. Id.
38. Simon Bowers, Apple’s Cash Mountain, How It Avoids Tax, and the Irish Link, THE
IRISH TIMES (Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.irishtimes.com/business/apple-s-cash-mountainhow-it-avoids-tax-and-the-irish-link-1.3281734.
39. Statement of Carl Levin, supra note 4, at 1. “Apple has sought the Holy Grail of tax
avoidance, offshore corporations that it argues are not, for tax purposes, residents anywhere
in any nation.”
40. Commission Decision 17/1283, SA.38373, 2017 O.J. (L. 187) 1, 5 (EU).
41. Dhammika Dharmapala, What Do We Know About Base Erosion and Profit Shifting?
A Review of the Empirical Literature (COASE-SANDOR INST. FOR LAW & ECON. Working Paper
No. 702, 2014), https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=238 5&co
ntext=law_and_economics.
42. Id.
43. Commission Press Release, supra note 7.
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While not always illegal, sometimes it is; and in Apple’s case, the EU
Commission found that Apple’s modified use of the “Double Irish”
arrangement was illegal and disproportionately affecting competition.44
C. EU State Aid Rules
Apple, therefore, from 1991 to 2014 managed to perfect the process to
avoid taxes in two primary ways: first, it effectively gave most of the
economic rights of the company’s R&D to its subsidiaries in Ireland. Put
simply, this allowed Apple (U.S.) to shift profits from its U.S. market to
Ireland by way of “royalties” for the use of the company’s intellectual
property. In other words, the Irish entity controlled which of Apple’s
subsidiaries were granted a license to utilize Apple’s intellectual property.45
So, for example, if an iPhone was sold in China, the Chinese subsidiary then
paid the Irish subsidiary for the use of the intellectual property. Second, it
structured its Irish subsidiaries so that all revenue on sales coming from,
Asia, Europe, the Middle East and Africa were all reported as earnings in
Ireland—exclusively.46 None of this would have been possible for Apple
without the endorsement of a unique “cost sharing agreement” carried out by
the Irish Revenue’s two rulings, first in 1991 and later reaffirmed in 2007.47
This piece was also central to the Commission’s investigation.
Consequently, in 2016, Commissioner Margrethe Vestager announced
that under the auspices of the EU’s competition policies, the Commission
found that Apple’s unique Irish subsidiary structure and the two tax rulings
issued by the Irish government permitting this structure resulted in favorable
treatment to Apple and was therefore, illegal under EU state aid rules.48
Under Article 107(1), of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union—Part Three: Union Policies and Internal Actions—Title VII:
Common Rules on Competition, Taxation and Approximation of Laws—
Chapter 1: Rules on competition - Section 2: Aids granted by States
(“TFEU”), State aid is prohibited if:
“. . . any aid granted by a Member State or through State
resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to
distort competition by favoring certain undertakings or the
production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Commission Decision 17/1283, SA.38373, 2017 O.J. (L. 187) 1, 5 (EU).
Id.
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between Member States, be incompatible with the internal
market”(emphasis added).49
Here, the Commission believed the Irish government “distorted
competition by favoring certain undertakings. . . .” According to the
Commission’s decision, the undertakings at issue were two tax rulings issued
by the Irish Revenue on January 29, 1991 and May 23, 2007.50 These rulings
gave preferential treatment to two entities in Ireland called, Apple Sales
International (“ASI”) and Apple Operations Europe (“AOE”).51 Competition
authorities in the EU took issue with these rulings because it claimed the
Irish endorsed a special cost sharing agreement which allowed Apple to use
a modified version of the “Double Irish” so that it’s Irish subsidiaries could
“substantially and artificially lower the tax paid by Apple in Ireland since
1991.”52 The amounts these subsidiaries reported as income and the amount
of tax they were actually paying did not correspond to economic reality.
Essentially, Apple created a system to shift most of its worldwide, sales’
profit back to one of these entities in Ireland.53 Unlike, a traditional “Double
Irish” arrangement, where a company sets up two Irish, incorporated
companies, managed by a group located in a lower tax jurisdiction—usually
somewhere in the Caribbean—here, the Irish government allowed Apple to
set up “branch” offices under one company.54 Each subsidiary has a “head
office” and an “Irish Branch.”55 This arrangement allowed for profits on
worldwide sales and R&D royalties to be shifted internally to a “head
office.” Meanwhile, the Irish branch only earned income on “operations.”56
In other words, the structure looked like this, ASI is a fully owned subsidiary
of AOE, which in turn is a fully owned subsidiary of AOI, which in turn is a
fully owned subsidiary of Apple, Inc. (parent company), which is
incorporated in the United States. ASI and AOE were both split into two
branches—the “head office” and the “Irish branch.” If Apple had followed
the standard “Double Irish” arrangement, ASI and AOE would have been

49. Commission Press Release, supra note 7.
50. Commission Decision 17/1283, SA.38373, 2017 O.J. (L. 187) 1, 5 (EU).
51. Id.
52. Commission Decision 17/1283, SA.38373, 2017 O.J. (L. 187) 1, 5 (EU).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Jessica Leber, How Apple Avoids Taxes through R&D Spending, MIT TECH. REV.,
(May 21, 2013), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/515281/how-apple-avoids-taxes-throu
gh-rd-spending/.
56. Commission Decision 17/1283, SA.38373, 2017 O.J. (L. 187) 1, 5 (EU).
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their own companies. Refer to FIGURE 3 & 4 for a visual illustration of these
arrangements.

Figure 3
Constanza Ortiz, Systems of Preferential Tax Treatments in the EU,
(2019).
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During its thorough assessment, the Commission learned that these
“head offices” existed only on paper and could not have possibly generated
the profit it reported, on its own.57 Additionally, it was uncovered that profits
which were rerouted to these “head offices” were not subject to tax in any
country under the specific provisions of the Irish tax law—this means the
Irish government not only knew, but endorsed the utilization of shell
companies incorporated in its own jurisdiction to bypass being taxed on more
than half of Apple’s worldwide income.58 Meanwhile it did permit for the
“Irish branches” to be taxed exclusively on operational costs which were a
fraction of the amount seen by the “head offices.”59 Further, the Irish revenue
allowed Apple to negotiate an even lower tax rate for the income held by the
“Irish branches.”60 Because of this allocation method endorsed in the Irish
tax rulings, Apple only paid corporate tax rate at 1% in 2003 and later had it
decreased to 0.005% in 2014 for the profits allocated to Apple Sales
International’s “Irish branch.”61 Meanwhile, the Senate’s investigation
highlighted that Apple’s “ghost company” with a mailing address in Cork,
Ireland received $29.9 billion in dividends from lower-tiered offshore
affiliates from 2009 to 2012.62 It declared this comprised 30% of Apple’s
global net profit—but all of it went untaxed. Without a shadow of a doubt,
the Commission determined this qualified as selective tax treatment of Apple
in Ireland. Essentially, it was illegal under EU state aid rules because it gave

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Statement of Timothy Cook, supra, note 2.
Statement of Timothy Cook, supra, note 2.
Commission Decision 17/1283, SA.38373, 2017 O.J. (L. 187) 1, 5 (EU).
Id.
Id.
Commission Press Release, supra, note 7.
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Figure 4
Constanza Ortiz, Systems of Preferential Tax Treatments in the EU, (2019).

Apple a significant advantage over other businesses that were subject to the
same national tax rules.
a. Why did Apple use the “Single Irish” Arrangement in Ireland?
What is frustrating about this case is the lack of consistent information
provided by reputable news sources on the topic of the altered “Double Irish”
arrangement used by Apple. When reviewing this case, the Commission
places so much importance on the contested tax rulings which allowed Apple
to have “branches” instead of separate companies in Ireland. Naturally, this
leaves one wondering why Apple made this decision. It is clear why the Irish
government would permit this structure to exist seeing as Apple has helped
turn this small nation into an economic powerhouse following its tumultuous
past—however, this leaves the original inquiry unanswered. The few
spectators which accurately detected the variance in structures hypothesized
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that perhaps Apple was interested in keeping the same management
structures it had implemented when it first came to Ireland in the 1980s.63
While this is certainly a possible explanation, it is not a satisfying one. This
is especially true, after some economists predicted had Apple kept the
traditional “Double Irish” arrangement, not only would there have been
similar if not identical tax savings for Apple, but also, the Irish Revenue
would not have needed to intervene to give special permission to set up
separate companies incorporated in Ireland.64 Put simply these economist
believed, if for example, Apple had incorporated ASI and AOE as two
separate companies incorporated in Ireland but “managed” in Cayman
Islands, which has no corporate tax, no income tax, no property taxes, no
capital gains taxes, no payroll taxes, and no withholding tax, then it would
have saved the same amount of money and have remained in a completely
legal tax jurisdiction per the laws of the EU.65 But this was not the case, and
Apple did in fact have a very good reason for their use of the altered “Double
Irish,” and it has nothing to do with management.
Only one source provides the most feasible explanation for this
question, and it is not in any of the Commission’s related documents, not
even in its one-hundred-and-thirty-page decision for this case. The answer
to this question can be found on the sixth page of the memorandum drafted
by those members of the U.S. Senate which conducted this investigation in
2013.66 The sixth page of this memo contains the findings and
recommendations of the Subcommittee’s investigation into Apple’s Irish
subsidiaries. The fourth recommendation made to Senate is to “Properly
Enforce Same Country Exception.”67 It was this provision of the U.S. tax
code on which Apple structured it entire “Single Irish” arrangement.
Before the Trump administration issued the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act in
2017, which implemented various new regulations promulgated by the IRS,
large corporations in the U.S. realized there were major tax advantages to
using a foreign corporation to conduct foreign operations. This is because
the company could defer tax on that income. The rule was, the U.S. would
not tax on the income of a foreign corporation, instead it would be deferred
until the income was re-distributed as a dividend or otherwise repatriated by

63. Cliff Taylor, Apple’s Irish company structure key to EU tax finding, IRISH TIMES
(Sept. 2, 2016), https://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/apple-s-irish-company-struct
ure-key-to-eu-tax-finding-1.2775684.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Statement of Carl Levin, supra note 4.
67. Id. at 6.
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the foreign corporation back to its U.S. shareholders.68 However, Congress
determined that this type of deferral was inappropriate and had been taken
advantage of, so it decided to implement the “Subpart F” provisions. The
Subpart F provisions eliminate deferral of U.S. tax on some categories of
foreign income by taxing certain U.S. persons on their “pro rata share” of
such income earned by their controlled foreign corporations (“CFCs”).69
Before, many U.S. taxpayers achieved deferral of U.S. tax on certain kinds
of passive income, such as dividends, interest, rents and royalties. They did
this by earning such income through foreign corporations; but, after Subpart
F provisions were implemented, all of these transactions were required to be
reported and taxed by U.S. tax regulators. However, to every rule there is an
exception, and Apple was quick to capitalize on this exception. Pursuant to
the Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”) §954(c)(3)(A)(ii) the “same country
exception,” refers to interest and dividends that are excluded from Subpart F
inclusions if they are “received from a related entity incorporated in the same
country as the recipient CFC and substantially engaged in business in such
country.”70 Additionally, rents and royalties are excluded from Subpart F
inclusions if they are “received from a related entity for the use of, or the
privilege of using, property within the CFC’s country of incorporation.”71
Taking this consideration into account required Apple to setup a “Single
Irish” arrangement.
Since Apple was looking to transfer most of its U.S. income to one of
the Irish subsidiaries by way of the R&D royalties, under Subpart F
provisions, this transaction constitutes a quasi-sale.72 For purposes of the
IRS, this then would also constitute income. However, because Apple
structured its subsidiaries under one company, incorporated under the same
jurisdiction, it was able to apply the “Same Country Exception.” Had it
applied the traditional “Double Irish” arrangement and opened the second
company offshore in the Cayman Islands, it would not have qualified for the
“Same Country Exception.” This is because the U.S. vests its tax jurisdiction
on a company dependent on where they are located—Ireland on the other
hand vests their jurisdiction dependent on where the management of the
company is located.73 Therefore, Apple would have needed to report the
second company as being incorporated in the Cayman Islands, which would
68. Id.
69. Receipt of Dividends or Interest from a Related CFC, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE
(Jan. 5, 2016), https://www.irs.gov/pub/int_practice_units/DPL9412_03_04.pdf.
70. Receipt of Dividends or Interest from a Related CFC, supra note 69.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Statement of Timothy Cook, supra note 2.
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have excluded them from applying the “same country exception.”
Meanwhile, by reporting both ASI and AOE as having a location in Cork,
Ireland, but with management in Cupertino, California, not only was it able
to avoid U.S. and Irish Corporate tax liability, but it also managed to exclude
the passive income transactions it would have otherwise been obligated to
report if it had not told the U.S. regulators that both ASI and AOE were both
in Ireland.
The importance of noting this fact has to do with international tax
enforcement. It was surprising to find no explanation of this issue in any of
the materials related to the case drafted by the Commission, let alone an
accurate account of events from news outlets reporting on the investigation.
The absence of this information sheds light on a bigger issue which is, tax
regulators perhaps do not conduct enough transnational due diligence to see
where one tax regime may create a loophole for another. Surely, Apple’s tax
planners and those of many other large corporations are conducting this due
diligence—and they are very good at it. It seems in order to stop a behavior
from happening it would be efficient to understand why the behavior occurs
in the first place. But without getting enough information to map out the
playing field, it would be impossible to see where the opponent has an
advantage. This case highlights a need to avoid silos of information between
two domestic regulatory bodies looking to supervise the intricate
transactions of companies who conduct business internationally.
IV. Unlawful State Aid in The EU
In 2016, when the Commissioner announced the final decision to
require Apple to repay Ireland 13 billion euros in recovery of state aid, the
commission received backlash from different members of the community.74
First, the Irish government declared it was not interested in receiving the
payment. Second, Apple and others alike argued this matter was not under
the jurisdiction of the EU seeing as the arrangements were made in
consultation with the Irish government and only concerned Irish tax law—
which is not, de facto, an issue subject to EU law.75 However, the
Commission clarified it had taken an interest in investigating this case
because the state aid granted by Ireland through the contested tax rulings was
incompatible with the internal market. This, therefore, posed issues which

74.
75.

Commission Press Release, supra note 7.
Foo Yun Chee, Apple Spars With EU as $14 Billion Irish Tax Dispute Drags On,
REUTERS (Sept. 18, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-apple-stateaid/apple-sparswith-eu-as-14-billion-irish-tax-dispute-drags-on-idUSKBN1W31FE.

7 - Ortiz_HICLR_V43-2 (Do Not Delete)

382

Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.

5/7/2020 3:10 PM

[Vol. 43:2

affected competition for the entire European Union.76 Since the EU does not
have a unified taxing authority, this matter fell under the jurisdiction of the
Commissioner of Competition. Recall that the Commission’s objective is to
uphold the treaties of the European Union promulgated by the Council.77
Issues affecting not one, but all member states, such as anti-competitive
behavior, is a problem for the Commission to resolve. Therefore, pursuant to
Article 108(2) of TFEU the Commissioner declared it had authority to
investigate this matter in consideration of this rule:
If, after giving notice to the parties concerned to submit their
comments, the Commission finds that aid granted by a State or
through State resources is not compatible with the internal market
having regard to Article 107, or that such aid is being misused, it
shall decide that the State concerned shall abolish or alter such aid
within a period of time to be determined by the Commission. . . .78
Recall, under Article 107(1) TFEU, the Commission must find the
following elements in order to meet the definition of aid contained in this
rule. It must show: (i) the measure was imputable to the State and financed
through State resources; (ii) the aid provided an advantage on its recipient;
(iii) the advantage provided was selective; and (iv) the measure distorted or
threatened to distort competition and had the potential to affect trade between
Member States. Once this is met, the Commission can order recovery of
illegal state aid for a ten-year period preceding the Commission’s first
request for information79—following the investigation held by the U.S.
Senate, the Commission sent a request for information to Ireland on June 12,
2013.
Here, concerning the first and second element, recall the contested tax
rulings in 1991 and 2007 allowed Apple to setup the unique “Single Irish”
structure, where its subsidiaries each had two “branches,” one which was
called the “head office” and the other, the “Irish branch.” Recall the head
office had no tax jurisdiction but received capital from most of the U.S. and
EMEA’s sale’s income by way of intellectual property licensing and the use
76. “It further recalls that, while the Member States enjoy fiscal autonomy in the field of
direct taxation, any fiscal measure a Member State adopts must comply with the Union State
aid rules, which bind the Member States and enjoy primacy over their domestic legislation”
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 107(1),
Oct. 26, 2012, 2008 O.J. (C 326) [hereinafter TFEU].
77. What does the Commission do?, EUROPA, https://europa.eu/european-union/abouteu/institutions-bodies/european-commission_en.
78. TFEU, supra note 76 at art. 108(2).
79. Commission Press Release, supra note 7.
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of other R&D expenses. Additionally, this ruling allowed Apple to negotiate
a lower corporate tax rate for the little money that was funneled back to the
Irish Branch for “operational costs.” Recall that in 2014, ASI paid 0.005%
in corporate income tax. Regarding the third element, state resources were
used because, effectively, the Irish Revenue agreed to the deprivation of
billions of dollars in tax which then resulted in a loss of tax revenue that
would have otherwise been available to Ireland. After the Commission’s
thorough investigation, it appeared this arrangement had only been provided
to Apple. This is not surprising seeing as Apple’s presence in Ireland, even
considering these tax cuts, had brought the country thousands of jobs and
billions of euros in profit.80 Lastly, the Commission declared that any aid
provided to a multinational giant the size of Apple, would create a distortion
to the market, not so much because of the significance of the aid, but because
of the size of the company and its relation to the global market. It was after
the Commission successfully met this standard, Apple was required to repay
Ireland, not the European Union, a total of 13 billion euros in back taxes.
V. Leprechaun Economics
Following the Commission’s opening of the investigation, Apple
declared it had closed its “Single Irish” arrangement in Ireland.81 As a result,
in 2015 the Irish revenue agency had to amend its reported GDP increase
from 26.3% to 34.4%.82 The Central Statistics office declared it could not
disclose the cause for the increase, but in 2018 economists were able to
confirm and attribute this increase to Apple’s restructuring—exclusively.
Because of Apple’s restructuring, the Tax Justice Network estimated that
profits of $660 billion were shifted making this the largest individual IPBEPS transaction in history.83 Nobel Prize-winning economist, Paul

80. Apple Statement, The facts about Apple’s tax payments, APPLE, INC. (Nov. 6, 2017),
https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2017/11/the-facts-about-apple-tax-payments/.
81. Directorate-General for Competition (EC), Alleged Aide to Apple, S.A. 38373 2014
O.J. (C 369). Also available at https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.
cfm?proc_code=3_SA_38373.
82. Heike Joebges, Working Paper: Crisis Recovery in a Country with a High Presence
of Foreign Owned Companies—The Case of Ireland (MACROECONOMIC POL’Y. INST. Working
paper No. 175, 2017), https://www.socialeurope.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/p_imk_wp_
175_2017.pdf.
83. Tax and corporate profits: how big?, TAX JUSTICE NETWORK, https://www.
taxjustice.net/topics/more/estimates-of-tax-avoidance-and-evasion/tax-corporate-profit-shift
ing-big/.
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Krugman famously coined this event as Leprechaun Economics.84 While
economists and regulators in the EU believed the closure of the “Single Irish”
was a sign of positive reform for tax compliance in Ireland, it was not. Apple
quickly replaced the “Single Irish” with the “Green Jersey” arrangement in
2016.85 This arrangement was another type of IP-BEPS which utilized
Capital Allowances for Intangible Assets (“CAIA”).86 Since the Irish
corporate tax system has a capital allowance for intangible asset schemes,
this allowed Apple to expense its intangible assets against its Irish pre-tax
income.
Seeing as the use of BEPS did not subside in Ireland and other
neighboring tax havens, the Commission instead proposed to re-launch the
implementation of the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base
(“CCCTB”) in 2016.87 The CCCTB, first proposed in 2011, was created to
provide a single set of rules for companies conducting business in EU
member states to compute their taxable income, rather than use many
different national rulebooks.88 In addition, companies would only have to file
one tax return for all of their EU activities and could use that filing to offset
losses in one member state against profit in another. In the case of a company
like Apple, where it conducts business all throughout the EU, the CCCTB
would make it so the consolidated taxable profits would be shared between
the member states in which the group is active in by using an “apportionment
formula.”89 Each member state would then tax its share of the profits at its
own national tax rate.
Naturally countries like Ireland, Luxemburg and Malta were major
opponents to this proposal in 2011 and the Commission had to stall its
implementation of these rules. In 2016, when the European Commission relaunched its proposals for an amended CCCTB it was received with renewed
opposition from several countries concerned about the implications of
CCCTB for their tax sovereignty and for their corporate tax revenues.
Currently, the Commission has added two amendments to the CCCTB with
hopes to assuage some of the backlash it had received from member states.90

84. Paul Krugman, Leprechaun Economics and Neo-Lafferism, N.Y. TIMES, (Nov. 8,
2017), https://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2017/11/08/leprechaun-economics-and-neo-lafferism/.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), EUROPA, https://ec.euro
pa.eu/taxation_customs/business/company-tax/common-consolidated-corporate-tax-base-cc
ctb_en.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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First, it made it mandatory for corporations to adhere to the CCCTB
provisions, and second, it agreed to postpone the “consolidation part” which
would require corporations to incur more tax planning expenses as they
would need to account for their subsidiaries in the EU as well.91 While
concessions have been made by the Commission, it is unclear whether the
CCCTB will be enough to put an end to preferential tax systems in the EU.
VI. Conclusion
What is the difference between tax avoidance and tax evasion? Should
global corporations like Apple take the grunt from legislators annoyed with
its expert use of loopholes found in a poorly managed tax code? In today’s
globalized economy, MNEs conduct business in all parts of the world and
are constantly pioneering new ways to legally avoid paying taxes. Base
Erosion Profit Shifting tools are just a few of the many techniques used by
large corporations to structure tax plans which allow them to bypass billions
of dollars in tax liability. Low tax jurisdictions like Ireland, Luxemburg and
Malta leverage these tools to attract companies such as Apple, Amazon and
Google to take residency in their countries to conduct their sales activities to
the rest of Europe. New regulations such as the CCCTB have been proposed
to standardize the allocation of tax liabilities, however, given the resistance
it has encountered because of its implications on state’s sovereignty, it is
unclear whether the Commission can rely on these measures to solve the
issue of abusive transfer pricing. This case study inadvertently highlights a
lack of cohesion between the EU and U.S. tax authority systems. Without
taking measures to create a unified front before MNEs transacting in their
respective regions, it is unclear whether billions of dollars will be kept out
of systems of preferential tax treatment in the EU.

91.

CCCTB, supra note 87.

